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Annex 1:  
 
Agenda Item 1: Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental Rights and Liberties  
Report on Status of Implementation 























   
By March 2008, Political 
violence was stopped in all 





While widespread rioting, arson and killing has stopped, political conflicts at the national 
level tend to trickle to the local level resulting in renewed threats of violence, particularly 
against returning IDPs 
The end of political violence has not translated into a violence-free society; gang violence 
and armed crime have increased 
New forms of violence in flashpoints beyond post-election violence-affected districts are 
reported, e.g. cattle rustling, cross-border incursions from Somalia, Uganda and Ethiopia 
Fault lines of divisions have become more entrenched; new political violence is likely to 





No. of active illegal 
groups 
 
Steps taken to 
disband / demobilise 
groups  
 
   
 
No organised group has 
been disbanded due to 
political support 
2004 crackdown on 
Mungiki  revived 
March 2008 - Military 
operations to clamp down 
on SLDF in Mt. Elgon 
 
March 2008 - 92 suspects 
arrested in post-election 
affected areas  
CIPEV report released in 
October 2008  
Groups for political hire have hibernated, but members reorganising autonomously into 
criminal gangs  
Aug- Sept 2008 human rights bodies release reports on torture by the military in Mt. Elgon 
and systematic execution of suspected members of an illegal group by police ‘hit squads’.  
In Feb 2009, UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial Killings confirmed police lethargy 
following reports of extra-judicial killings  
.  
Since the release of the UN report, illegal groups seem to have reorganized. Their presence 
poses a dilemma for everyone concerned with human rights – rights’ defenders advocate for 
sanctity of human life while ordinary citizens seem to support extra-judicial killings of 
suspected illegal group members 
 
Arrests kicked off amnesty debate; civil society groups raised concern that suspects from 
one community which organized retaliatory violence were not arrested; Case to be 
    2 
 
determined in May 2009 
Motion to establish Special Tribunal defeated in March 2009, triggered threats against 
returning IDPs in the Rift Valley; plans underway to re-introduce motion  
 Disarm 
groups 





2008 –March 2009: 2,800 
firearms recovered from 
civilians 
Feb 2009 –five arms caches 
intercepted in Nandi  
National Action Plan on 
Small Arms is under 
implementation  
None of these arms was specifically recovered from illegal groups, who do not use firearms 
but peacetime agriculture or kitchen tools 
Widespread allegations or increased armament of ethnic groups in ‘preparation’ for future 
violence 
Focused on cross-border security and disarmament in pastoral areas. In the absence of 










No. of measures to 
increase police 







Measures to protect 
vulnerable groups  
 
2008-Feb 2009: 35 new 
police stations constructed 
in PEV-affected districts 
 March 2008: New police 
hotlines operatonalised 
Jan 2009: 4,500 new police 
officers recruited and 
deployed  
Sept 08 – Feb 2009: 38 
‘special’ DOs and 40 new 
DCs deployed to fast-track 
return to normalcy 
April 2008: Gender desks 
introduced at police stations 
 By March 09: disciplinary 
measures (prosecution, 
interdiction, dismissal, 
Stations constructed near IDP return sites, inadvertently creating the impression that they 
were for one community; stations understaffed; infrastructure without public goodwill 
ineffective to guarantee security – threats and leaflets to IDPs camping at police stations 
The new numbers not well known to the public 
 
Creation of new districts without proportionate recruitment of personnel stretching capacity 
 
Most trainings target DCs and Dos, but it is lower rank officers who  interact with the 
people; need to revisit this approach 
 
Gender desks occupied by women only, concerns that men also need to be heard. Many 
gender desks claim people are not reporting to them. need to investigate  
Allegations that former police officers leading criminals and ‘training’ ethnic militia, e.g. 
leader of SLDF believed to be former soldier 
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transfer)  taken against 










No. of incidents that 
violate  the rights to 
peaceful assembly  
No political rallies have 
taken place since Jan 2008 
Selective permits for 
demonstrations  
Public gatherings that could 
lead to a breach of peace not 
allowed  
Leaders, including the principals, increasingly relying on public gatherings (funerals, 
churches, weddings) and the media to articulate political agenda 
Perception that permits are issued to pro-government petitions – e.g. protests against the 
Mungiki Sect or against the withdrawal of the military from Mt. Elgon 
Arbitrary arrests of human rights activists on the rise, e.g. members of Bunge la Mwananchi 
Officers refuse or evade receiving notices  of such meetings –e.g. KPTJ 
  No. of incidents that 
violate the freedom 
of expression  
March 08: Order to ban live 
media coverage lifted 
 
August 08 -March 09: 
Partnership with NGOs to 
train on ‘conflict-sensitive’  
Individual journalists claim harassment for writing unpopular stories  
 
March 2009: Increased incidence of harassment of human rights defenders, creating a 
climate of fear. UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial killings released a statement 






No. of enabling 
legislation enacted 
Jan 09: President assents to 
Communications Act  
Feb 09: Communications 
Act (1998)  under review to 
remove contentious clauses 
The President’s assent triggered a chorus of protests against clauses deemed to be efforts to 
gag the media.  
Allegations that the media fraternity misrepresented facts to the public to resist government 
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Agenda Item 2: Immediate Measures to Address the Humanitarian Crisis and Promote National Healing and 
Reconciliation 
Report on Status of Implementation 
 (Matrix on Progress) 









 Legal and 
institutional 
framework 
The National Reconciliation and 
Emergency Social and Economic 
Recovery Strategy elaborated 
Humanitarian Fund established 
 
Department of Mitigation and 
Resettlement established in the 
Ministry of Special Programmes 
 
Operation Rudi Nyumbani 
launched in May 2008 
The strategy adopted IDP description in Guiding Principles but 
ignored international guidelines on establishing a framework 
for national responsibility  
The Government raised only Ksh1.96 billion of the required 
Ksh31.46 billion budget 
The Department in the Ministry of Special Programmes, Office 
of the President, is a technical department relying on other 
ministries for staff at the district and lower levels. Attendant 
challenges include coordination and accountability. 
Resettlement programme is hindered by inter-ethnic hostility 
and sporadic violence in some return areas of the Rift Valley; 
allegations of use of force and corruption in administration of 
IDPs’ funds 
Resettlement programme focused on IDPs who were land 
owners and in camps to the exclusion of integrated IDPs and 
those from several other ethnic communities 
There is need for a National Policy on IDPs  
 Reduce IDPs No. of camps 295 out of 296 camps officially closed There is proliferation of ‘transit’ sites in return areas by IDPs 
who are unable and/or unwilling to return to their farms 
because of insecurity 
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Objective  Required Actions Indicator Progress Towards Output Remarks  
Hawkers, squatters, business people, landless IDPs without 
start-up capital or prospect to lease land or premises remain in 
closed camps 
Self-help groups of IDPs have established their own camps in 
safer areas. These camps lack basic services  
There is proliferation of slums or ‘new cities’ exclusive to IDPs 
Closure of official camps is not an end to displacement 
There is need for a strategy on transit camps, since 
displacement is becoming more protracted 
  No. of IDPs Registration at camp level by Kenya 







Countrywide Ministry of Special 
Programmes profiling of IDPs in 
conjunction with UNHCR and the 
Kenya National Bureau of Statistics – 
tentative results show 663,921 IDPs, 
nearly double the January estimates 
More than half of IDPs did not go to camps. Those who did not 
go to camps included displaced ‘indigenous’ people and the 
economically well-off 
Operation Rudi Nyumbani created a fluid IDP situation 
Focus only on post-election violence affected IDPs, excluding 
old caseload IDPs and displacement caused by protracted 
conflict in Mt Elgon, cattle rusting and drought/floods has 
deepened the IDP problem 
Lack of common understanding of who is an IDP – recognition 
often contingent on land ownership or other arbitrary 
categorisation  
There are inconsistencies in statistics on IDPs. Agencies have 
different figures on IDPs 
Cases of double or multiple registration of households inflate 
the number of IDPs 





Emergency Humanitarian Response 
Plan appeal funded 71% 
Lack of coordination among agencies dealing with IDPs was a 
challenge at the height of the crisis 
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Objective  Required Actions Indicator Progress Towards Output Remarks  
assistance  Government, UN, Kenya Red Cross 
and NGOs adopted ‘Cluster Approach’ 
to deliver all forms of emergency 
assistance 
Regular cluster meetings to enhance 
identification of gaps and reduce 
duplication  
Strengthened coordination structures 
chaired by relevant government 
ministries  
Funding shortfall: many agencies ran out of funds at the end of 
June 2008 and closed office without a clear exit strategy, 
leaving serious assistance gaps 
 
Logistics: Transit camps are too many, remote and too far 
apart, making delivery of aid difficult or impossible 
Priority: Other emergencies resulting from drought and food 
insecurity, and high food prices have diminished the 
significance of IDPs as a vulnerable group in need of special 
assistance. Attention to IDPs is on the decline 
Transition from emergency to early recovery has not been easy 
due to abrupt closure of camps and inability of IDPs to fully 








 Joint peace 
rallies 
 
After signing the National Accord the 
President and Prime Minister made a 
symbolic tour of the Rift Valley and 
called for peace 
Principals and various groups of 
politicians and government officials 
preached peace at various functions  
The importance of the  joint peace rally by the President and 
the Prime Minister was reduced by protocol wars between the 
Prime Minister and Vice President 






Secretary on National Cohesion 
appointed by the Office of the 
President to work within the Ministry 
of Justice 
Operation Ujirani Mwema (Good 
Neighbourliness) launched by the 
Vice President  
Operation Tujenge Pamoja (Let’s 
Build Together) launched by the 
Secretary resigned four months after appointment citing 
frustration and lack of political will to support reconciliation  
Office has been vacant since end of July 
Perception that the reconstruction of destroyed houses and 
schools is in favour of the returning IDPs has bred resentment. 
Operation Zuia Madoadoa (prevent return of the ‘stains’) 
mooted by some  ‘indigenous’ communities in the Rift Valley 
to prevent government-led pro-IDP ‘Operations’ 
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Objective  Required Actions Indicator Progress Towards Output Remarks  
Ministry of Special Programmes 
Peace-building curriculum developed 
for primary schools 
Launch of ‘Operation Karibu 
Nyumbani’ in January 2009 led by 
Agriculture Minister, William Ruto, 
Rift Valley MPs and the provincial 
Administration  
Ethnically-segregated schools and emergence of boundaries 
and ‘No Man’s Land’ as groups strive to stay apart 
Although politicians claim to be promoting peace and 
reconciliation, some are said to be mobilising youths for 
violence 
  Functional 
District Peace 
Committees  
District Peace Committees mandated 
to hold peace rallies and meetings in 
return areas 
Lack of funds to facilitate peace rallies has been a challenge  
Peace rallies are ineffectual in mediating certain conflicts, e.g., 
illegal tenants in IDPs’ homes, armed cattle raiding, etc. 
Low level of community participation in reconciliation and 
healing forums remains a challenge 
Limited legitimacy of peace committees at community level – 
some members are suspected perpetrators or associates of 
politicians who mobilised for violence. Peace committees  are 
also said to have included unpopular individuals at the local 
level 




Peace and reconciliation led by the 
early recovery cluster 
Support peace meetings between 
communities 
Training on peace-building and 
conflict management 
Includes early recovery support with 
seeds, farm tools or cash vouchers  
Development projects benefiting all 
 Perception that more is done with returning IDPs than with 
receiving communities  
Most early recovery interventions reportedly ignored the “Do 
No Harm” principle by targeting only one community 
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Objective  Required Actions Indicator Progress Towards Output Remarks  
communities in return areas  







TJRC Bill drafted and critiqued by 
civil society; revised 
Bill passed into law, assented to by 
President  
National Selection Committee and the 
Panel have submitted their nominees 
to Parliament but members are yet to 
be appointed 
There is a growing perception that if recommendations of 
other Commissions (IREC and CIPEV) are not implemented, 
people will not have faith in the TJRC  
Civil society is concerned about amnesty clause 
There is need for public awareness campaign on the TJRC  
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Agenda Item 3: How to Resolve the Political Crisis (Coalition Government/Power-Sharing) 
Report on Status of Implementation 
(Matrix on Progress – January – March 2009) 
OBJECTIVE REQUIRED 
ACTIONS 


















(No. of positions 
shared between 
the parties) 
Cabinet positions left vacant 
due to the death of 2 ODM 
ministers and the resignation 
of the Finance Minister (PNU) 
in June 2008 were filled in 
January 2009 through a mini-
shuffle of the Cabinet 
A number of Permanent 
Secretaries, heads of 
parastatals and ambassadors 
appointed 
Challenges still exist in the exercise of the Prime Minister’s powers 
due to apparent institutional conflict between his office and that of 
the Vice President, and the Head of Public Service. Complaints 
about the lack of effective consultation on high-level appointments 
remain a source of tension within the coalition 
Splitting ministries to cater for the power sharing agreement has 
generated management challenges in the ministries of Medical 
Services and Public Health and Sanitation. Their respective roles 
and departments need to be spelt out 
The interpretation and application of the principle of portfolio 
balance remains controversial with respect to high-level public 
appointments. Constitutional reform can effectively settle the 
controversies around power sharing 




INDICATOR PROGRESS TOWARDS 
OUTPUT 
REMARKS 




uncoordinated response to the 
UN report on extra judicial 
executions (Alston report) 
illustrates disharmony and 
lack of consultations within 
the government 
Intra- party cohesion at very 
low levels among the coalition 
partners 
Political cohesion is critical for achieving reforms. However, 
reforms have been slowed down by unwillingness to embrace 
them, personal and ethnic differences. It is important to manage 
ethnic tensions and mistrust within the coalition to reenergise the 
reform process. The political leadership of the two principals is 
important in this regard. 
% of public who 
perceive real 
power as being 
shared (locally 
and nationally) 
54% of our respondents do not 
think the Prime Minister is 
exercising his powers. 34% 
think he is exercising his 
power and 12% do not know if 
he doing so 
Political bickering over appointments and lack of cohesion within 
the coalition is to blame for low public perception of equal power 
sharing between the partners. Unity within the coalition is 
important and the principals can rally their party members to 
cultivate inter and intra-party cohesion 
Level of public 
satisfaction in 
the functioning 
of the Grand 
Coalition 
Public approval for the 
coalition government has 
dwindled one year down the 
line. 77% of respondents think 
the coalition does not work 
well 
The low approval rating results from a perceived lack of 
commitment by the Grand Coalition to meet Kenyans’ immediate 
needs. The coalition needs to inspire public confidence through 
delivery. 
Level of public 
satisfaction in 
the make up of 
public sector 
Ethnicity remains an issue in 
filling public sector positions. 
People think the positions are 
an avenue to access public 
Balancing ethnic identity cannot be ignored in high-level public 
sector appointments, but  ethnicity needs to be managed so that it 
does not hold hostage the reform agenda 














push through a 
reform agenda 






bodies e.g., Cabinet sub-
committees, in place 
Vision 2030 adopted 
Recurrent power struggles 
between the Office of the 
Prime Minister and that of the 
Head of Public Service, as well 
as between the ministries of 
Public Health and Sanitation, 
and Medical Services 
Redefine the role of the PM and the Head of Public Service to 
avoid apparent conflicts, which are illustrative of incoherence and 
undermine public confidence 
Coalition partners should adopt a structured approach to enhance 
coherence in decision making. The permanent committee to 
manage coalition affairs needs to mitigate conflict and enhance 
coherence in government 




Kenyans’ confidence in the 
coalition government has 
dwindled mostly due to 
wrangles within over sharing 
of power and positions. The 
wrangles will affect service 
delivery 
The coalition risks losing the confidence of Kenyans, who appear to 





place/in use  
A Permanent Committee to 
manage coalition affairs set up 
on Jan 15, 2009. 
Mediation team should finalise the conflict management 
agreement for signature by partners and use by so the committee 
to manage coalition affairs. Without an engaging framework, the 
committee will not be effective.  
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Agenda Item 4: Long Standing Issues and Solutions 
 
Report on Status of Implementation 
 
(Matrix on Progress) 
 
Issue Expected action Timeframe Progress towards 
implementation 
Remarks 
Constitutional reform Consultation with stakeholders Consultation 
launched and 
review statute 





reform to be 
completed in 12 
months from the 
date of enactment 
of statute 
 
Initial consultations between 
civil society organisations and 
the Ministry of Justice, 
National Cohesion and 
Constitutional Affairs over 
content of the review statues 
undertaken in August and 
October 2008 
Consultation frameworks were said to be 
inadequate to facilitate meaningful 
engagement 
 
There is need for measures to foster 
sustained engagement of all stakeholders 
throughout the process 
Parliament to enact constitutional 
review statute 
Review Acts – Constitution of 
Kenya Amendment Act, 2008 
and Constitution of Kenya 
Review Act, 2008 enacted in 
December 2008 
The time between formation of the coalition 
and the enactment of the laws was 
significant (8 months), hence delaying the 
process 
Draft constitution prepared in a 
consultative process, with expert 
assistance 
Process of selecting experts to 
assist in the review process 
instituted in December 2008. 
Committee appointed, sworn in 
and commenced its work in 
March 2009 
Deletion of the Fourth Schedule to the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Act, which 
allows for consultative preparation of the 
constitution, hence barring consultation. 
Amendment is necessary to ensure 
adequate consultation and participation in 
the review process 
Parliament to approve Largely dependent on 
finalisation of the review 
process 
The current factional mobilisation that 
characterises parliamentary debates on 
Bills could compromise or scuttle the 
process if consensus is not reached. There is  
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Issue Expected action Timeframe Progress towards 
implementation 
Remarks 
need to build consensus on areas of 
divergence 
 
Political involvement in the review process 
could negatively impact on the credibility of 
the review process 
People to enact through a 
referendum  
Largely dependent on 
finalisation of the review 
process 
Referendum could be divisive and driven by 
partisan politics as opposed to real 
constitutional issues. This could scuttle the 
process, especially if the principals do not 
build consensus on areas of divergence 
 
There is need to build consensus on 




Constitutional review to anchor 
judicial reform  
 
Constitution to be 
adopted in 12 
months 
 
Partly dependent on enactment 
of a new constitution 
Delay in enactment of a new constitution 
may delay some of the judicial reforms  
Enact Judicial Service Commission 
Act with provisions for: 
• Peer review mechanism 
• Performance contracting 
Draft Bill was finalised in May 
2008 and awaits publication 
The Bill captures issues on peer review but 
omits the performance contracting 
requirement. There is need to sensitise and 
build consensus with Judges on the need to 
embrace performance contracting as a 
means of enhancing efficiency in the 
delivery of services 
Institutional reform: 
Police 
Constitutional review to establish 
an Independent Police 
Commission 
Constitution to be 




Review process to 
be completed 
within 6 months 
 
To some extent depends on 
enactment of a new 
constitution 
Delay in enactment of a new constitution 
would derail police reforms 
Review laws and issues related to 
security and policing (including 
independent complaints 
commission, citizen oversight of 
police services, enhanced 
information disclosures, human 
Police Oversight Board 
constituted 
There appears to be lack of ownership of 
the board by the police force because the 
Minister for Internal Security did not 
adequately consult them in its initiation  
 
Following its formation in September 2008, 
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Issue Expected action Timeframe Progress towards 
implementation 
Remarks 
resource management and 
capacity building) to make them 











training to be 
completed by 2012 




Recruit and train more police 
officers to raise the police-to-
population ratio to the UN 
standard 
In June, additional police 
officers were recruited. Further 
recruitment to be undertaken 
in May 2009  
This was marred by allegations of 
corruption and discrimination. There is 
need to institute an accountable, fair and 
competitive recruitment system 
Institutional reform: 
Civil service 
Parliament to pass bill 
incorporating civil service reform 
measures from past draft 
constitutions 
Review to be 
completed within 
6 months upon 




contracting to be 
entrenched in the 
constitution 
Partly dependent on enactment 
of a new constitution 
Delay in enactment of a new constitution 
may delay civil service reforms 
Appropriate constitutional and 
legal reforms will be undertaken to 
facilitate parliamentary vetting of 
senior public appointments 
To be facilitated by a new 
constitution 
Delay in enactment of a new constitution 
may delay this process 
New legislation on whistle blower 
protection, freedom of information 
and operationalisation of the 
Witness Protection Act, 2006 
Programme to operationalise 
the Witness Protection Act, 
2006 was launched in May 
2008. The Witness Protection 
Unit officially launched in 
March 2009 
The full operationalisation of the Act is 
paramount in encouraging key witnesses to 
sensitive cases to provide crucial evidence 
Review Standing Orders to ensure 
parliamentary oversight over 
membership of committees is 
based on competency and integrity 
There are new Standing Orders 
that would become operational 
during the third session of the 
10th Parliament 
This depends on operationalisation of the 
new Standing Orders 
Institutional reform: 
Parliament 
Comprehensive review of 
parliamentary standing orders and 
procedures to enrich quality and 
output of parliamentary debates 
and strengthen multi-party 
Review to be 
completed within 
6 months 
New Standing Orders adopted 
on 10 December 2008 and will 
become operational during the 
third session of the 10th 
Parliament 
The Standing Orders propose far reaching 
parliamentary reforms. Aspects such as 
number of parliamentary committees could 
be challenging to implement. The reform 
could also be undermined by divisive 
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Issue Expected action Timeframe Progress towards 
implementation 
Remarks 
democracy politics and lack of political good will 
Land Reform Constitutional review to address 
fundamental issues of land tenure 
and land use 
Land reform 
process to be 
factored in the 
constitutional 
review process 
within 12 months 
Some aspects to depend on 
enactment of a new 
constitution 
Delay in enactment of the new constitution 
would derail land reforms 
Finalisation of draft National Land 
Policy and attendant legislations 
Awaits discussion and adoption 
by Cabinet 
 
Land Reform Transformation 
Unit constituted in January 
2009 
 
It has taken too long to finalise the 
discussions around the draft land policy. 
Lack of political goodwill and interests of 
large-scale land owners have significantly 
derailed the process  
 
There is need to design measures to build 
consensus on various areas of divergence  
Poverty, inequality and 
regional imbalances 
Ensure equity and balance are 
attained in development across all 
regions, including in job creation, 
poverty reduction, improved 
income distribution and gender 
equity 
Implementation to 
be reviewed within 
2-3 years 
Ministry for Development of 
Northern Kenya and other Arid 
Lands was established in April 
2008 
 
Kenya’s Vision 2030 prioritizes 
tackling poverty and addressing 
inequality and regional 
imbalances. The Vision has 
been operationalised in the 
five-year medium term plan 
 
 
There is need to allocate adequate resources 
in terms of finances and personnel to this 
ministry to enable it undertake its mandate 
 
The efforts need to target women and other 
disadvantaged groups 
Unemployment 
particularly among the 
youth 
Generate an average of 740,000 
new jobs each year from 2008-
2012 





The Ministry of Youth has also 
initiated a Youth Employment 
Marshall Plan, which aims to 
create over 500,000 jobs on 
both the formal and informal 
sectors beginning January 
2009 
 
Kazi kwa Vijana 6-month 
The high unemployment rate among the 
youth persists. Expeditious implementation 
of the Marshall Plan is pertinent in 




Programme requires political commitment 
to ensure financial challenges are addressed 
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Youth Enterprise Fund to be 
increased and mechanisms put in 
place for easier access to credit and 
collateral  
The fund has received a 
significant boost. So far Ksh1.75 
billion has been allocated and 
Ksh500 million planned for the 
Fund this financial year  
 
Private sector has set aside 
Ksh2.5 billion to boost the 
Youth Enterprise Fund  
Not all youth are well organised to access 
this fund. As such, measures should be 
undertaken to build the capacity of the 
youth on entrepreneurship, including the 
need to organize themselves into groups to 
access the funds 
Consolidating National 
Cohesion and Unity 
Finalise and support enactment of 
the National Ethnic and Race 
Relations Bill by Parliament 
National Ethnic 
Relations Bill to be 
passed by 
Parliament within 




















The Bill was debated on 27 
November 2008. It was 
renamed the National Cohesion 
and Integration Act, enacted in 
December 2008 and made 
operational in March 2009 
 
Applications for commissioners 
of the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission sought 
Measures to be undertaken to ensure 
effective implementation of the Act.  
Parliament and executive to 
initiate and sustain advocacy role 
on ethnic and racial harmony 
In March 2008, President 
Kibaki and Prime Minister 
Odinga held a joint public 
peace and reconciliation rally 
 
Civil society organizations, the 
private sector are involved in 
peace building initiatives 
The two principals have not sustained their 
efforts in advocating peace and 
reconciliation through public forums  
 
Civil society and private sector initiatives 
have not meaningfully engaged 
communities and hence the lack of 
ownership of the efforts by the respective 
communities 
 
There is need for sustained advocacy efforts 
on peace and reconciliation. These efforts 
must of essence meaningfully engage 
communities to foster ownership 
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Issue Expected action Timeframe Progress towards 
implementation 
Remarks 
Finalise the Hate Speech Bill and 
review the Media Act to control 
incitement attempts 
Communications of Kenya 
(Amendment) Act 2008 
enacted to instil responsibility 
in the media 
The Act was faulted as having clauses that 





Strengthen and improve capacity 
of anti-corruption agencies and 
strengthen the laws to fight 
corruption1 
Review progress of 
implementation 
within 6 months 
There was no data to indicate 
that any steps are being taken 
to strengthen the capacities of 
anti-corruption agencies and 
laws. To the contrary, reports 
indicate a significant rise in 
corruption cases 
Cases of grand corruption have continued 
to spiral  
 
The fight against corruption has not been 
proactive 
 
The institutions charged with fighting 
corruption have limited capacity and lack 
prosecutorial powers 
 
The rising levels of corruption is an 
indication that we have lost the war and 
this has been very costly 
 
The rising cases of corruption bedevilling 
the coalition have eroded public confidence 
in the Grand Coalition 
 
 
                                                 
1 See matrix by Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation.  
